

























This paper represents the first step of a path I am walking 
through in order to understand in depth 
the characteristics and problems of the 
Italian higher education sector and poli-
cies. It was born from the idea to study 
my country, after being focused for my 
PhD thesis on the New Zealand higher 
education context, which I chose out of 
interest to study something very differ-
ent (and geographically far, the farthest 
country in the world from Italy) from 
what I know. Now I come to analyse Ita-
ly, and I think I can look at it from a 
more detached and possibly unbiased 








– WHEN IDEAS DON’T 
MEET POLICIES: ITALY 
AND THE REFORM 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Summary  In the article a review is provided of the implementation of various strategies 
and policies which have been introduced into the Italian higher education system. The 
author shows that the most significant impact of the implementation of such policies is 
the creation of enormous amounts of data, facts and figures. He, however, puts forward 
a highly sceptical view on whether the evaluation activities have actually contributed to-
wards systemic, institutional learning in higher education policy. He concludes that the 
Italian case in higher education policy has shown the existence of two levels in the Ita-
lian higher educational policies: a formal one, really modern, apparently ready to change 
and sensitive to the new ideas, and an informal one that makes it impossible de facto to 
implement the norms and the laws that are sometimes made through the years. Ignoring 
the existence of these two levels can lead to several errors of analysis regarding the Ita-
lian case-study.

























ods of my life in New Zealand and Eng-
land, now I feel ready to speak about Ita-
ly without a typical Italian “accent”. And 
this could be a basis for a comparison 
between realities that are never consi-
dered to be studied together (Italy and 
New Zealand). Of course, it is a trial, and 
the following is really the start of it.
1. Theoretical Framework
Political science and sociology tra-
ditionally emphasised the role of the in-
dividual interest in the policy process-
es of capitalistic societies; less emphasis 
has been put on how ideas could deep-
ly influence those processes (Campbell, 
2002). Only in recent times has this as-
pect been studied in depth (De Rosa, 
2009). From this point of view, it seems 
good to me to review the major theori-
zation in this sense.
Campbell (2002) makes a review of 
the major theories in this path. He starts 
by taking into consideration two groups 
of theories: the first focuses on so-called 
cognitive paradigms, that are visions of 
the world of policy-makers which define 
the range of choices that they consider 
when they have to formulate different 
kinds of policies. 
The second group of theories takes 
into consideration the normative frame-
works. Following this theory, normative 
ideas are assumptions on values, identi-
ties, and other socially shared expecta-
tions. From this point of view, policy-
-makers usually operate according to a 
logic of moral or social pertinence. The 
normative beliefs could be so strong as 
to overwhelm the individual interests 
of policy-makers. In fact, they influence 
in depth the way in which they perceive 
their interests, and which policies and 
institutions they prefer. 
Other studies use the cognitive para-
digms and the normative frameworks 
not to clarify the differences between the 
policies, but to show the similarities be-
tween them. They explain that the affir-
mation of a Western political culture has 
made the national political institutions 
and the policy-making apparatus homo-
geneous. This literature can be included 
in the thread of so-called world culture. 
In this sense, Røvik (1996) describes 
how these ideas move fast and far, and 
shortly are internationally perceived as 
the best approach possible.
Anyway, there are authors who un-
derline how important local and nation-
al characteristics play a role against uni-
formity. For example, Halpin and Troyna 
(1995) state that different countries seem 
to do similar things, but if they are exa-
mined more in depth, they turn out to 
be not as similar as they seem at first.
Some researches try to explain how 
policy-makers draw some public policies 
to be acceptable to the majority of peo-
ple. From this point of view, the political 
elite strategically create some structures 
and use them to legitimate their choices 
in the eyes of the public. This is the so-
-called frames literature. 
Another extremely important thread 
is the one of programmatic ideas. Fol-
lowing this point of view, policy change 
derives from new programmatic ideas. 
Often they are the dependent variables 
for political sociologists and political 
scientists. 
All these paradigms seem to lack one 
element: the explanation of the causal 
mechanisms which are fundamental for 
the influence of ideas on policy-making. 
Several studies have tried to give an an-
swer to this question. A way to do this is 


























tors bring some ideas in the policy arena 
and then use them effectively. These ac-
tors are often academics and other intel-
lectuals. Their preparation and prestige 
are very important to make their voice 
heard over the voices of everyone else. 
In the same way, think tanks and re-
search institutes can have a great influ-
ence. From this point of view, we can 
talk of epistemic communities at the in-
ternational level. They are responsible 
for generating new ideas and diffusing 
them among the national policy-mak-
ers and other people in the international 
community.
Kekk and Sikkink (1998) argued that 
these networks are effectively important 
because their members are often respon-
sible for generating the most important 
ideas that constitute the world culture, to 
which sociologists attribute isomorphic 
effects at the national level (Kekk, Sik-
kink, 1998, cited in Campbell, 2002: 30).
Another hypothesis that has been 
considered to explain the influence of 
ideas on the policy processes is the one 
that underlines the weight and impor-
tance of institutions. They can deter-
mine which ideas can be put in the pro-
cess, and then adopted and implemented 
as policies. From this point of view, the 
diffusion of ideas is a much more com-
plex and mediate process than what is 
generally thought. 
Surel in particular underlined the 
value of two variables that seem to be in-
sufficiently considered by the literature 
on ideas: the interest of actors and the 
role of institutions. If, for instance, we 
consider that one nation is a subsystem, 
and that it is subject to a similar norm as 
the others, it could be effectively possi-
ble to isolate the discrepancy within the 
diffusion of some social paradigms. The 
particular and different reception of the 
same paradigm in each nation allows us 
to identify and compare the operationa-
lization dynamics of these norms, partly 
related to specific structures of interests 
and institutional configurations in each 
national context. Surel himself gives us 
an example when he discusses the dif-
ference of meaning ascribed to the neo-
-liberal ideology during the period of its 
diffusion in France, United States and 
Germany (Surel, 2000: 506-507).
On the other hand, Geva-May talks 
about public policy and policy-making 
itself being profoundly influenced by 
ways of life and cultural biases of their 
cultural context. Consequently, the cul-
tural factors should be considered with-
in the analysis of public policies. From 
this point of view, the author talks about 
culture as the neglected variable within 
the context of this analysis (Geva-May, 
2002).
Developing the cultural approach of 
Douglas and Wildavsky, Swedlow iden-
tifies a differentiation of policies, de-
pending on the social contexts in which 
we operate. From this point of view, he 
makes a distinction in: hierarchic con-
texts, to which we can associate the con-
cepts of order and property; egalitarian 
contexts, to which we can associate the 
concepts of equality and liberty; indivi-
dualistic contexts, to which we can asso-
ciate autonomy and personal space; and 
fatalistic contexts, to which we can asso-
ciate fortune and hope to survive (Swed-
low, 2002: 271-272).
Hall’s point of view is also very in-
teresting. He stresses how changes in 
the policy paradigm are decisive in the 
adoption of one or another possible po-
licy solution, and applies this concept to 
the shift from the adoption of the Key-
nesian paradigm to the monetarist one 
























Kingdom (Hall, 1993). The author in-
terprets the policy paradigm as an in-
tellectual construction, strongly related 
to a policy subsystem that contains a se-
ries of ideas shared by the same policy 
actors. The interrelationship between 
these ideas permits to establish the ob-
jectives of the different policies, because 
it determines which definition of the 
problems will be adopted. Furthermore, 
the paradigm warrants the resolution of 
problems and the fulfilment of objec-
tives. In fact, it constitutes a universe of 
meanings as well as a set of institutional 
practices. Being composed of ideas, the 
policy paradigm has a double connota-
tion: on the one hand, it establishes the 
goals of a policy and the conceptual map 
that will be used to give meaning to re-
ality. In this way, it becomes a source of 
inspiration that is essential to the iden-
tity of policy actors (in this sense it has 
an affective nature and is strictly relat-
ed to the beliefs and visions of the world 
of policy actors and, from this point of 
view, we can say that the affective nature 
of the policy paradigm is its policy core). 
On the other hand, the cognitive part re-
presents its flexible part, the main func-
tion of which is to protect the deep core. 
The affective nature of the deep core of 
the policy paradigm is the reason why it 
is so difficult to change it. At the same 
time, the cognitive connotation explains 
how it is possible to modify it in several 
directions (Capano, 1999: 61).
The role of ideas is not always a suc-
cessful one within the different policy 
arenas. Sometimes bright ideas do not 
translate in new policies that are coher-
ent with them, and this determines a 
sort of “non-success” of the ideas them-
selves in being effective.
The goal of the present paper is to 
describe a case of policy stalemate con-
cerning the Italian higher education po-
licies in the last eighty years. This con-
text is really important to analyse be-
cause here we can see how a lot of bright, 
interesting ideas did not have any effec-
tive policy result. The choice of this po-
licy sector is due to its huge resilience to 
any attempt of change through the years. 
In order to show the situation in a dia-
chronic spectrum, I opted for the metho-
dology of an historical dense description 
of the trials of policy reforms within the 
Italian higher education sector. 
2. Attempts of Reform 
For more than a century now, the 
Italian higher education sector has been 
characterised by continuity. Few real 
changes were made during the 1930s, 
under the Fascist regime, while during 
the first 40 years of the post-war Repub-
lic, only marginal, incremental modifi-
cations were introduced. These changes 
did not alter the basic, original features 
of the management of Italy’s higher edu-
cation system and of the mechanisms of 
governance within the universities.
The traditional model of institution-
al and systemic coordination was cha-
racterized by the absolute dominance of 
academics. The Italian case constituted a 
specific variation on the classical oligar-
chic model; the combination of powers 
between academic guilds and the State 
bureaucracy was of an asymmetric na-
ture; the former exercised a much great-
er influence than the latter. Academic 
schools and guilds constituted the real 
coordination mechanisms both at the in-
stitutional level (where decisions made 
by individual universities were simply the 
sum of the preferences of the most pow-
erful academic groups and subject-areas 
within the said institutions), and at the 


























fact, was based on informal, but persist-
ent interrelations between the most pow-
erful local chair-holders and the minis-
terial bureaucracy. Although this was, in 
theory, a centralised system, central de-
cisions were in fact taken under pressure 
from the most powerful academic schools 
and groups. Centralised control was of a 
purely formal, bureaucratic nature: dur-
ing the phase of implementation, every-
thing was negotiable between the centre 
and the periphery of the system. 
Universities as autonomous institu-
tions simply did not exist; indeed, it is 
doubtful whether they could really have 
been considered institutions as such. In 
fact, they were not in a position to decide 
anything of any importance themselves: 
the most important decisions – those 
regarding budget allocation, academ-
ic recruitment and strategic planning – 
were in the hands of the system’s central 
powers (and were governed by the pre-
viously mentioned informal bargaining 
process). This meant that in the internal 
decision-making process, real authori-
ty lay not with the universities’ official, 
democratically elected governing bodies 
(the Senate, the Administrative Board, 
faculty councils, etc.), but with individ-
ual professors with tenure, the so-called 
university barons, and with their pow-
erful networks. Individuals with formal 
power (such as Rectors and Deans) were 
expected to mediate between the differ-
ent, often divergent interests of internal 
groupings, but without the necessary 
institutional power to do so indepen-
dently. Universities were simply arenas 
where individuals and groups of aca-
demics managed internal power on the 
basis of almost con-federal or federal re-
lationships. 
Self-government, collegiality and de-
mocracy (the fact that all institutional 
positions were elective) were mere rhe-
torical devices. Self-government only 
covered marginal issues; collegiality was 
a meaningless term concerning the oli-
garchic logic of a system based on the 
personal interaction of chair-holders, 
while democracy was a symbolic in-
strument legitimising roles with limited 
concrete powers. 
The challenge represented by the 
move towards a mass education system 
– an international trend that has forced 
all Western governments to introduce 
periodical structural innovation in their 
higher education systems since 1960 – 
proved incapable of modifying the deep-
-rooted features of governance in the 
Italian university system. The increase 
in numbers has been enormous: in 1960 
there were about 268,000 students en-
rolled at Italy’s universities: by 1980 this 
number had exceeded 1 million, and by 
2006 the total student population had al-
most doubled again, to about 1,800,000. 
However, the massive raise in numbers, 
in the absence of the necessary struc-
tural transformation of governance 
mechanisms, meant that the perform-
ance of the inherited system worsened. 
The pressure of numbers made the go-
vernance system even more fragmented. 
This because the rise in numbers of the 
permanent teaching staff rendered bar-
gaining between academic groups more 
difficult. So, the institutional decision-
-making style inherited from the past 
now had to satisfy a much larger set of 
preferences. This led to a transition from 
distribution to microdistribution, and to 
a further reduction in the universities’ 
capacity to adapt to external changes 
and to the new demands of the socio-
-economic system. 
Thus the way things were conducted 
























mained unchanged for decades in spite 
of the rapid, radical changes in the exter-
nal environment.
However, quite unexpectedly, and 
thanks largely to the entrepreneurial 
spirit of one individual, Antonio Ruber-
ti, first Minister for Higher Education 
and Research, the age of reform got un-
derway in 1989. That year, Law 168 was 
passed. This law marked the beginning 
of a process of innovative national le-
gislation which has continued right until 
the present day. It set up a new ministry, 
which took over the responsibility for 
higher education and research from the 
Ministry of Education, but this ministry 
was conceived as a central coordinating 
agency capable of controlling the correct 
implementation of governmental direc-
tives and goals. Furthermore, Law 168 
provided for a general framework of di-
dactic, organisational and scientific au-
tonomy for all universities. 
The reform process saw the develop-
ment of the (contradictory) plan for cen-
tralised de-centralisation. The principles 
inherent in this approach seem to con-
form to the newly fashionable self-regu-
latory model of higher education. 
The new policy strategy based on the 
politics of institutional autonomy, imple-
mented by the Italian government since 
the passing of Law 168 in 1989, need-
ed the support of strong institutions to 
be genuinely effective. But universities 
were, on the contrary, very weak insti-
tutions at the time. One of the most im-
portant signs of the difficulties to be 
encountered in implementing the new 
policy was the timing with which the 
universities established their own status. 
The problem was that the rules govern-
ing universities were the product of the 
past democratic-representative age, and 
as such they were not compatible with 
the age of accountability. However, the 
inability of the national government and 
parliament to change this general frame-
work transformed these rules into con-
straints. What happened is that universi-
ties dealt with the design of their internal 
government by resorting to their inherit-
ed consensual, corporative practices and 
employing them within an unchanged 
general framework. The risk was that 
the universities, not being forced to 
strengthen their institutional leadership 
and management, would decide to keep 
their inherited democratic culture, and 
this is exactly what happened. A histo-
rically rooted culture based on corpora-
tive-democratic principles substantially 
conditioned the design of the universi-
ties’ internal governing structure. 
So, as it ever happens in the Italian 
environment, there was a strong differ-
ence between the formal and the infor-
mal rules. The truth is that Italian uni-
versities continue to be highlighted by 
profound problems regarding the ques-
tion of the relationship between politics 
(that is, the power of academics) and ad-
ministration (that is, the role of non-aca-
demic staff, and especially of those in 
senior academic positions). The idea 
that university professors are both rule-
-makers and arbitrators in deciding how 
the said rules are to be implemented is 
still deeply embedded in the Italian uni-
versity system. 
Another important step on the path 
through the Italian reforms in the high-
er education sector dates back to 1999. 
In fact, Italy was the first country to im-
plement the Bologna Declaration guide-
lines: the Declaration was signed in the 
spring of 1999, and immediately after-
wards (the following autumn) a mini-
sterial decree was issued introducing 


























universities in general were totally sur-
prised by the introduction of the reform. 
The radical reform of the pre-existing, 
one-tier system led to the creation of a 
bachelor/master’s degree system, the ba-
sic features of which are as follows:
a. strong interdependency of the first-
-level degree, lasting three years, with 
the second-level (specialisation) last-
ing 2 years
b. introduction of educational credits, 
conceived as units by which to mea-
sure a student’s workload
c. greater degree of autonomy for uni-
versities in establishing the contents 
of their educational programmes. 
The most important shortcomings 
and weaknesses which emerged from 
the implementation of the new degree 
framework were as follows:
a. remarkable proliferation of first and 
second-level degree courses
b. unsuitable use of credit systems
c. proliferation of first and second-le-
vel master’s degrees
d. unchanging nature of university 
teaching.
It is no surprise to discover that the 
university system’s central powers were 
forced to intervene in an attempt to get 
universities to behave more virtuous-
ly. This happened in 2002, with the in-
troduction of minimum structural re-
quirements for the creation of a degree 
course. It happened again in the latter 
half of 2006, with a recent new ministe-
rial regulation setting an upper limit of 
20 examinations on bachelor’s degree 
courses, and of 12 examinations for the 
Laurea Magistrale. So, in order to cor-
rect the direction taken by the autono-
mous universities, the government was 
forced to take a step backwards and limit 
their very autonomy. 
The ongoing debate is restricted to a 
narrow group of policy and political ac-
tors. Higher education is not deemed a 
particularly important topic in Italian 
politics and society. The mass-media 
only focus on higher education when 
something dramatic happens (strikes, 
complaints, appeals against the results of 
processes of academic recruitment, and 
so on) (Capano, 2008a: 482-498).
In his seminal study on Italian uni-
versities, Burton Clark (1977) under-
lined the specific characteristics of the 
powerful national academic guild. His 
diagnosis of the triumph of particular-
ism characterised Italian academics as 
strongly individualistic figures, pos-
sessing absolute academic power and a 
considerable capacity to influence the 
political system (Government and Par-
liament) from within. Clark empha-
sized in particular the ability of this in-
dividualistic, particularistic oligarchy to 
get organised at the national level. Ac-
cording to Clark’s analysis, the deep-
-rooted nature of that system can only 
be challenged by a process of decen-
tralization, even if this could entail the 
risk of excessive parochialism (Clark, 
1977).
Changing higher education is not a 
simple task, especially in Italy. Univer-
sities are resilient institutions par ex-
cellence, perfectly capable of defending 
their own inherited practices, values, 
routines and internal interests. None-
theless, they sometimes have to change 
in order to survive. In the Italian univer-
sities, survival attempts are clearly not 
in keeping with the needs of society or 
with government requirements. The real 
problem affecting universities in Italy is 
that of institutional governability. Why 
is it so difficult to place what is empiri-
























the Italian case, there are three funda-
mental constraints. 
The first one is cultural: the majority 
of the leading players (the inner-circle of 
policy-makers) in higher education po-
licy at all levels – government, ministers, 
trade unions, student associations, rec-
tors and the most distinguished scholars 
– are still convinced that the traditional 
values of collegiality and democracy are 
of vital importance. They believe that 
the autonomy of Italy’s universities is not 
working for the simple reason that they 
are underfinanced.
The second constraint is represent-
ed by the perceived social irrelevance of 
universities in Italy.
The third one is that, from a politi-
cal point of view, higher education po-
licy has never been among the priorities 
of the Italian political parties. 
The only hope lies with the opening 
of a policy window, and above all with 
the emergence of an entrepreneurial 
policy-promoter capable of presenting 
the need for change, together with a se-
ries of radical solutions, in terms that are 
more acceptable to the major policy ac-
tors (Capano, 2008a: 501-503).
This kind of dynamics can be ob-
served also in the implementation of the 
ideas of evaluation and accountability. 
These are two of the most popular catch-
words employed by higher education re-
formers in the Western world over the 
last twenty-five years. Universities, just 
like other public organizations, have un-
dergone profound, radical change dur-
ing that time. Generally speaking, this 
has been the age of New Public Mana-
gement for universities as well, even if 
this epithet only partly reflects what has 
been going on in Western higher educa-
tion systems. The ivory towers of high-
er education have been under constant 
pressure to change their attitude, be-
haviour and traditional values, and the 
question of evaluation and institutional 
accountability have been of focal impor-
tance to the ensuing process of change. 
Evaluation implies external scrutiny and 
assessment of all fundamental university 
functions; not only research and teach-
ing, but also administrative activities and 
financial management. Institutional ac-
countability, which represents the other 
side of the coin, means that universi-
ties are asked to give account of their 
own performance to external stakehold-
ers, in particular to the government and 
the public. Evaluation and institutional 
accountability are two fundamental as-
pects of the steering at a distance strate-
gy that has been adopted in recent years, 
especially in Europe. Seen from a com-
parative perspective, this has not been a 
homogeneous process. Institutional ac-
countability and different forms of eva-
luation have also been introduced in Ita-
ly over the past twenty years. At the end 
of this process, in January 2006, a huge 
report was presented, comprising a fi-
nal report for each academic subject, a 
rating of each university, and a ranking 
of universities, subdivided according to 
size. 
The procedures, dynamics and re-
sults of the first research exercise were 
characterized by considerable problems 
and methodological shortcomings. Fur-
thermore, with regard to the knowledge 
function, it is clear that universities were 
forced into doing something of a sub-
stantially unknown nature: they were 
asked to examine themselves and select 
what they deemed to be the best pro-
ducts offered by their own constitutive 
subject areas. This was a complex pro-


























did not possess a data set for their mem-
bers’ research products. 
The accountability/governance func-
tion is another story, however. Indeed, 
no substantial decision has been made 
by either government or the Ministry on 
the basis of the research exercise.
As regards the learning function, it is 
very difficult to assess the impact of the 
research exercise; for sure it can be said 
that the majority of the universities are 
not working on drawing lessons from 
past experience and results. 
What emerges, therefore, is that eva-
luation strategies and policies have been 
introduced into the Italian higher edu-
cation system, and the majority of insti-
tutional activities are subjected to vari-
ous forms of assessment. However, the 
truth is that the most significant impact 
of the implementation of such policies 
is the creation of enormous amounts of 
data, facts and figures. Furthermore, it 
is highly doubtful whether the aforesaid 
extensive evaluation activities have actu-
ally contributed towards systemic, insti-
tutional learning. 
Finally, the results of this process of 
evaluation are nowadays not sufficient-
ly clear and transparent that they could 
be used to help the universities’ poten-
tial clients (students, entrepreneurs, 
firms, families, etc.) in choosing a spe-
cific degree-course in which to enrol, or 
a department to which a certain research 
project may be entrusted. 
3. An Historical Stalemate
The situation described above puts 
into evidence the existence of two levels 
in the Italian higher educational policies: 
a formal one, really modern, apparent-
ly ready to change and sensitive to new 
ideas; and an informal one, that makes 
it impossible de facto to implement the 
norms and laws that are sometimes 
made through the years. Ignoring the 
existence of these two levels can cause 
several errors of analysis regarding the 
Italian case-study. In this analysis I tried 
to show some of the ambiguities that are 
more evident in higher education poli-
cy-making. Anyway, the presence of a 
big implementation gap is to be found in 
several other policy sectors in Italy. The 
consequences of the situation make the 
Italian context a really difficult one to ex-
periment with any trial of policy change, 
and Italy a place that can be connoted 
through history as a really conserva-
tive place in policy and cultural terms. 
Under this light, the potential power of 
new ideas that are sometimes taken into 
consideration by some policy-makers is 
neutralized by the inertia at the level of 
implementation. Of course, a contribu-
tion to this situation of immobility is giv-
en also by some institutional assets and 
some individual interests that sometimes 
prevail in the moment of making some-
thing new. Anyway, my point is that the 
prevalent explanation for this pheno-
menon in the Italian context is both cul-
tural and historical. For this reason, it 
has been very interesting to me to ana-
lyse the case-study of my country, after 
having analysed the one of New Zealand, 
which represents the exact opposite in 
terms of higher education policy: radical 
ideas resulted in radical policy changes 
in 10-15 years. As one may have noticed, 
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Hic sunt leones – kada ideje ne prate politike: 
Italija i reforma visokog obrazovanja
SAŽETAK U članku se podastire prikaz implementacije različitih strategija i politika koje su 
bile uvođene u talijanski sustav visokog obrazovanja. Autor pokazuje da je najvažnija po-
sljedica provedbe tih politika bilo stvaranje enormne količine podataka, činjenica i razli-
čitih vrsta prikaza. On, međutim, izražava sumnju jesu li spomenute evaluacijske aktivno-
sti zapravo doprinijele sustavnom, institucionalnome učenju u području politika visokog 
obrazovanja. Autor zaključuje da je talijanski slučaj u području politike visokog obrazo-
vanja ukazao na postojanje dviju različitih razina u talijanskim politikama visokog obra-
zovanja: formalne, doista moderne, koja je nedvojbeno spremna na promjene i otvorena 
spram novih ideja u javnim politikama, i neformalne, koja snažno ograničava implemen-
taciju normi i zakona vezanih uz područje visokog obrazovanja. Ignoriranje postojanja tih 
dviju razina može dovesti do niza grešaka u analazi talijanskog slučaja.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI politika visokog obrazovanja, implementacija politika, uloga ideja u refor-
mama javnih politika, Italija
